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CO-OPERATIVE COMPETITION: A FOUCAULDIAN PERSPECTIVE1 
 
I. 
This paper considers the extent to which Michel Foucault's conception of power gives a 
useful explanation of power relations between firms. It examines the perceived shift in 
the nature of interfirm relations from the traditional model in which firms operate as 
autonomous units within a competitive industry, to the co-operative competition model 
whereby firms engage in co-operation at certain levels of their operations and compete 
at other levels. It argues that the concepts of power and competition are closely 
intertwined and that an understanding of how power operates can give a greater 
understanding of the nature of competition within an industry. However the issue of 
power relations in the presence of co-operative competition has not been adequately 
explored by the literature. An analysis of the type of power reflected in interfirm 
relations is held as being the key to understanding the simultaneous existence of co-
operation and competition between firms.  
 
II. 
This paper rests on the hypothesis that different types of competition are synonymous 
with different types of power.  In neoclassical theory and in transaction cost theory, 
imperfect competition is portrayed as being synonymous with a definition of power as 
the capacity to dominate. We argue that this type of power cannot be synonymous with 
certain types of co-operative competition.  
 
In neoclassical theory, firms are depicted as isolated, autonomous entities. The 
existence of market power is seen as synonymous with the existence of imperfect 
competition. In imperfectly competitive markets, power lies with an individual firm (or 
group of firms). This type of power coincides with the traditional political philosophy 
view of power as the capacity to dominate. A dominant firm has characteristics or 
attributes which allow it to coerce other firms to act against their interests in ways which 
benefit the dominant firm. Market power can be easily identified through firm size, 
market share or growth rates.     
 
Transaction cost theory also considers firms as autonomous. Even where production 
processes are complex and contain many different stages, co-operation is not an 
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efficient solution. Rather, firms must integrate vertically to avoid inefficiencies. If they 
do not, they incur transactions costs (Williamson 1975). As in the neoclassical theory 
of the firm, transaction cost theory implies a definition of power as the capacity to 
dominate. Williamson has shown a reluctance to analyse power directly seeing power 
as a tautological concept. He argues that power analysis is typically ‘an exercise in ex-
post rationalisation: power is ascribed to that party which, after the fact, appears to 
enjoy the advantage’ (1995, 33).  The concept has no ability to predict which firms are 
likely to gain the attributes allowing them to dominate. Williamson argues that power 
‘will not shed its tautological reputation until a unit of analysis has been named and 
dimensionalized’ (1995, 34). He requires that a power analysis take the form of a 
formalised model and come up with empirically testable predictions. This coincides with 
the desire of the Critical Theory school associated with Lukes2 and Habermas who also 
take a positivistic approach to the analysis of power. Throughout this (1995) paper 
Williamson speaks of power only in terms of dominance and as something which 
stands in opposition to efficiency.   
 
Williamson’s work on hierarchies within firms has been extended by Hamilton and 
Feenstra (1995), to account for interfirm co-operation. Williamson argues that, within 
firms, power comes from the top down. Again, this reflects a ‘power as capacity to 
dominate’ definition. Hamilton and Feenstra argue that the concept of hierarchy can be 
used to describe power relations across firms. They take Williamson's hierarchy 
concept from a Weberian slant and come up with the following definition of ‘economic 
organisation’: 
 
 To the extent that a network of people or firms are linked together by the 
exercise of binding norms, then that network functions as an economic 
organisation. To the extent that networks of people or firms are linked together 
only by their individual economic interests, then that network does not 
constitute an organisation in its own right. The key point in this definition is the 
participant's subjective recognition that they are bound to the authoritative 
norms of the organisation, that they are not formally free to act in other ways 
and that there is a coercive means to enforce the normative rules (1995, 63).  
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Does the type of economic organisation described by Hamilton and Feenstra reflect a 
different type of power relation between firms than that reflected in neo-classical and 
transaction cost models? They outline two types of network - the vertically controlled 
network and the horizontally controlled network. The vertically controlled network 
reflects power in terms of  capacity to dominate. A powerful family or firm  decide on 
and enforce the rules of the network. In this way, the family control the behaviour of 
other institutions (subcontractors, trade unions, and so on) within the network. There is 
co-operation, but it is enforced co-operation.  
 
The horizontally controlled network is composed of ‘conceptually equivalent units’ 
(1995, 69). These units are dominated by ‘organisational rules’ (1995, 69)  which are 
derived from a number of possible sources, for example, ‘ritual decorum, ethnic pride 
or bureaucratic professionalism’ (1995, 69). These rules would prevent the 
development of monopolies, vertical and horizontal integration within the network. They 
therefore determine or control the behaviour of firms within the network.  However, 
Hamilton and Feenstra do not discuss who is responsible for establishing and 
maintaining these norms of behaviour. Their definition of economic organisation 
implies that there is some form of consent involved among participants in the network; 
that they have consented to be bound by the norms laid down by the network. 
 
The idea of power as involving the consent of those who are governed is the ‘second 
major conception of power in  modern Western thought’ (Hindess 1996, 10). In this 
definition, some individual is given power legitimately in order that they might pursue 
the collective goal. However, Hamilton and Feenstra also say that there is ‘a coercive 
means to enforce the normative rules’ (1995, 63).  This suggests that participants in 
the network are bound by the established norms out of fear. If this is the case, there 
must  be some institution which has  the capacity to rule the network.  The mention of 
coercion suggests that this institution may not have the consent of participants in the 
network but rather controls their behaviour through repression. If this interpretation is 
correct, Hamilton and Feenstra’s description of power among firms is no different from 
 Williamson’s description of power within firms. Power is still (largely implicitly) defined 
as the capacity to dominate and, as such, it precludes non-coercive co-operation 
between firms. 
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Hamilton and Feenstra’s research suggests that there can be a type of competition 
which involves co-operation but which operates on a ‘power as capacity to dominate’ 
basis. This may be more correctly termed ‘co-opted competition’.  Other researchers 
have highlighted the existence of co-operative competition which does not reflect any 
coercion and is therefore truly co-operative. In this paper, it is the latter definition we 
imply when we use the term co-operative competition. We argue that Michel Foucault’s 
conception of power gives a framework with which to analyse co-operative competition. 
The next section gives a brief outline of Foucault’s framework. 
 
III. 
It is difficult to pin down Foucault’s conception of power. It is not confined to a single 
text and his views change between his earlier and his later writings. There does seem 
to be a general consensus as to what Foucault’s writings on power are not, however. 
‘There is in Foucault’s writings no theory of power, not even a sketch of such a theory’ 
(Cousins and Hussain 1984, 225; see also, for example, Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 
184; Hoy 1986, 129). Foucault provides instead a ‘tool-kit for the analysis of power 
relations’ (Cousins and Hussain 1984, 225). He is concerned with the techniques as 
opposed to the nature of power. He provides an alternative conception of power to the 
traditional notions of power as capacity and/or with consent. Foucault’s argument starts 
with the Nietzschean view that power can be both positive and negative. It is not 
always synonymous with repression as it is presented in Marxian and feminist 
analyses, for example. Foucault admits that in his earlier work, Madness and 
Civilisation, he did use power in its repressive form, ‘but it seems to me now that the 
notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the productive 
aspect of power’ (1984, 60). 
 
Critical theorists such as Lukes and Habermas see power as the antithesis of freedom, 
with freedom being brought about by scientific knowledge which provides an escape 
from ideology. Foucault, on the other hand, argues that knowledge cannot be 
‘emancipated from power relations’ (Hoy 1986, 133). The two are always bound 
together in ‘power-knowledge’: 
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 there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the 
same time power relations (Foucault, 1984, 175). 
 
This immediately introduces an analytical problem. How can power operate if 
individuals are free to behave as they will? Foucault gets around this problem by 
arguing that previous analyses of power have defined freedom wrongly. Their definition 
of freedom is abstract: ‘from his claim that a society without power relations would be 
an abstraction, it follows that freedom in the absence of power would be equally 
abstract’ (Hoy 1986, 139).  For Foucault, there is no such thing as knowledge that is 
free from ideology, so knowledge can never provide freedom.  
 
Hindess provides a succinct description of Foucault’s  argument: ‘power is exercised 
over those who are in a position to choose, and it aims to influence what their choices 
will be’ (1996, 100). For Foucault, power determines individuals’ behaviour not by 
coercion but rather by controlling individuals’ decisions to behave. It is found in all parts 
of all societies. In Discipline and Power, he identifies in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries the development of ‘a new “economy” of power, that is to say, procedures 
which allowed the effects of power to circulate in a manner at once continuous, 
uninterrupted, adapted, and “individualised” throughout the entire social body’ (1984, 
61). Foucault’s framework represents a ‘shift from global to local forms of power’ 
(Cousins and Hussain 1984, 239). For him, the state is ‘far from being able to occupy 
the whole field of actual power relations’ (1984, 64).  Power operates in micro-powers 
at the local level of societies. It does not come from the top down as in the traditional 
definitions of power. But if power is omni-present then it must take different forms in 
different types of relations. This generates another problem. Is Foucault’s analysis of 
power too general to say anything useful?  According to Hoy, Foucault avoids this 
problem by appealing to the nominalist nature of  the term power. He also argues that 
that there is no one theory of power: ‘Foucault considers power-knowledge in social 
relations, but without saying that this is the only possible description’ (Hoy 1986, 137). 
 
How might a Foucauldian analysis be carried out? In his earlier work,  The Order of 
Things (1966), Foucault introduced a method he called archaeology. This is  the 
‘analysis of systems of knowledge’ (Davidson 1986, 221).  In archaeology, Foucault 
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wants to look at the systems for producing ‘truth’  within the human and social 
sciences. He considers the societal structures, or epistemes, that make ideology 
possible. Initially, Foucault explores the idea of knowledge as a concept without any 
specific consideration of the systems within which power and knowledge might interact. 
He provides an analysis of power ‘without a corresponding conception of system, 
without a developed notion of a social structural framework’ (Honneth 1991, 150). The 
result of archaeology, for Honneth, is ‘arbitrariness in the notion of power’ (1991, 150).  
 
In his later work, Foucault adopts and develops the Nietzschean concept of genealogy. 
He defines genealogy in the following way: 
 
 genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of 
knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make 
reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of 
events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history (1984, 
59). 
 
This involves analysis of the ‘modalities of power’ (Davidson 1986, 221).  Foucault 
attempts to analyse the ‘microphysics of power’ (1984, 175). In genealogy,  Foucault 
sees the social sciences as acting in the form of disciplines. The disciplines are central 
to the concept of power-knowledge. ‘Discipline’ is a play on words as it suggests 
control and in turn power, but it also means the process of learning and therefore 
suggests knowledge. Foucault defines discipline as ‘a type of power, a modality for its 
exercise, combining a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of 
applications, targets’ (1984, 206). It ‘increases the forces of the body (in economic 
terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)’ 
(1984, 182). But this power does not act by coercion or consent as it does in the 
traditional definitions: 
  
 It is a power exercised over one or more individuals in order to provide them 
with particular skills and attributes, to develop their capacity for self-control, to 
promote their ability to act in concert, to render them amenable to instruction, or 
to mould their characters in other ways (Hindess 1996, 113). 
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How exactly is this power exercised?  In Foucauldian analysis, power is exercised 
within a network of social interaction as distinct from being located with a particular 
individual or institution. The network is developed at the instigation of a number of 
minor processes. These minor processes have a number of possible identities: `an 
industrial innovation, a renewed outbreak of certain epidemic diseases, the invention of 
the rifle, or the victories of Prussia' (1984, 182-3). Foucault summarises these 
processes as ‘small acts of cunning endowed with a great power of diffusion’ (1984, 
183).  These processes generate the need for knowledge which is gathered and put 
into action in three stages: ‘hierarchical observation, normalising judgement, and their 
combination in a procedure that is specific to it - the examination’ (1984, 188). Foucault 
uses the ‘military camp’ to demonstrate: ‘in the perfect camp, all power would be 
exercised through exact observation; each gaze would form part of the overall 
functioning of power’ (1984, 189). It is this constant surveillance which controls 
individuals by controlling their choices of particular action. ‘The perfect disciplinary 
apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly’ (1984, 
182). Foucault invokes Bentham's ‘panopticon,’ a design for a prison whereby all 
prisoners could be observed at all times from a single location3. ‘It is the fact of being 
constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined 
individual in his subjection’ (1984, 199).  
 
Foucault views the impact of changes in production processes on the organisation of 
factories in the late eighteenth century as reflecting this type of technique of power: ‘it 
was a question of distributing individuals in a space in which one might isolate them 
and map them; but also of articulating this distribution on a production machinery that 
had its own requirements’ (1984, 144). The need for control of the workforce and the 
economic benefits of the division of labour into single-purpose tasks led to organisation 
founded upon mass production: 
 
 By walking up and down the central aisle of the workshop, it was possible to 
carry out a supervision that was both general and individual: to observe the 
worker's presence and application, and the quality of his work; to compare 
workers with one another; to classify them according to skill and speed; to 
follow the successive stages of the production process (1984, 145).  
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This observation of behaviour builds up into an wealth of statistical information on 
individuals. Norms of behaviour are derived from this information. Judgement is 
passed as to whether individuals are acting in accordance with ‘normal’ behaviour. 
Surveillance results in what Foucault calls the ‘objectification of those who are 
subjected’ (1984, 197). Individuals make choices on the basis of what they believe is 
their own free will. But they actually make these choices according to the norms 
established by the disciplines through their observations. In this way, individuals are 
subjected to power-knowledge but also created by it. Thus, for Foucault, ‘humanism is 
a failed philosophical project because it takes Man to be its foundation for knowledge, 
whereas he is one of its effects’ (Simon 1995, 25). Observation and judgement 
culminate in the examination: ‘the examination combines the techniques of an 
observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgement’ (Foucault 1984, 197). It 
consists of teaching the individual the norms by which he is supposed to act: ‘the 
examination enabled the teacher, while transmitting his knowledge, to transform his 
pupils into a whole field of knowledge’ (1984, 198). Furthermore, the examination 
involves individuals reporting on their own behaviour and thus adding to the knowledge 
held about them: ‘the examination that places individuals in a field of surveillance also 
situates them in a network of writing: it engages them in a whole mass of documents 
that capture and fix them’ (1984, 201). Foucault's new conception of power ‘"makes" 
individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise’ (1984, 188). 
 
A failure to meet with the norms established by the disciplines results in punishment 
which ‘is aimed neither at expiation, nor even precisely at repression’ (1984, 195). 
Rather, disciplinary power operates through ‘the constraint of conformity’ (1984, 195). 
As Amariglio puts it, 
 
 the mad are silenced by reason in two ways; they are institutionalised by the 
practitioners of reasoned discourse so that their voice is silenced outside their 
cells. And the mad are further silenced by the master discourse, the science, 
that studies the words of the mad only to superimpose the voice of reason over 
that of the mad (1988, 604).  
 
There is an element of disciplinary power which appears hierarchical but the crucial 
point is that those who engage in surveillance are themselves watched: 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 20 
9 
 
 For although surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that of a 
network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom 
to top and laterally; this network "holds" the whole together and traverses it in 
its entirety with effects of power that derive from one another: supervisors, 
perpetually supervised (1984, 192). 
 
Thus, in Foucault's system, power does not have a single, identifiable locus. The power 
is the network itself. Those who supervise have no autonomous power, since the 
network ‘constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with the task of 
supervising’ (1984, 192). A genealogical analysis involves a mapping of the network to 
identify the techniques of power. Foucault’s proposal  that we consider a ‘how’ as 
distinct from a ‘where’ of power has been questioned by his critics. According to 
Rouse, Foucault's critics ‘cannot (yet) conceive what power or knowledge without 
sovereignty could mean. So the question that needs to be posed is how Foucault 
thought his account might successfully go beyond sovereignty’ (1994, 105).  But 
Foucault does not set out to describe alternatives to sovereignty; nor does he seek a 
theory of power: 
 
 Those who come to Foucault's work looking for solutions will be perpetually 
disappointed. Foucault's project - in both his politics and his histories - was not 
to lay out solutions, but rather to identify and characterise problems (Gandal 
1994, 273). 
 
IV. 
This section uses Foucault’s conception of power to describe co-operative competition 
in industrial districts. Industrial districts are described as ‘geographically defined 
productive systems, characterised by a large number of firms that are involved in 
various stages and in various ways, in the production of an homogenous product’ 
(Pyke et al. 1992, 2). The existence of two characteristics in particular identify this type 
of industrial network: a social milieu, and the existence of both competitive and co-
operative elements in inter-firm relations. It is argued that small local firms compete 
successfully on the world market because they gain competitive advantage from 
external economies of scale and scope, and because vertical and horizontal co-
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operation combined with horizontal competition between the firms ensures continual 
innovation.  
 
The concept of an industrial district, which was first described by Marshall in the late 
19th century, evolved in the late 1970s as a means of explaining the economic success 
of what is now known as the ‘Third Italy’ (Brusco 1982, 167). The concept has since 
been used to analyse local economies throughout Europe (by, for example, Benton 
1990,  Kristensen 1990, Murray 1990, Schmitz 1990). It has also been applied to local 
economies in Africa, the US and Latin America (see Sverisson 1992, Castels and Hall 
1994 and Nadvi 1992, respectively). This work is inductive - it presents  no theoretical 
framework for the analysis of co-operation between firms. Instead it entails descriptive 
accounts of the types of co-operation found in different industrial districts. Emphasis is 
placed on what such co-operation involves, as opposed to how it arose in the first 
instance, whether co-operation is common, and how co-operative relations are 
maintained. Competition and co-operation have long been presented as dichotomous, 
but the industrial district literature shows examples of where they harmoniously co-
exist. Traditional definitions of power, which form the basis of traditional models of 
competition, cannot explain the initiation, development or maintenance of this co-
existence. The identification of co-operative competition necessitates a  re-definition of 
power relations in industries in order to rationalise the strategy selected by these firms 
and to provide a theoretical explanation for the empirical evidence. A Foucauldian 
framework may provide a suitable alternative definition of power.  
 
The first issue to be dealt with is the extent to which the Foucauldian concept of 
network corresponds to the concept of the industrial district. For Foucault, power is 
reflected in the network itself, rather than belonging to any dominant member of the 
network.  Likewise, in most  industrial districts, no one firm or group of firms is in a 
dominant position.  Firms within the district do not operate autonomously. The 
subcontracting process of production means that firms operating within the district 
specialise in different stages of the production process. This type of production process 
necessitates a flow of information between firms on products and production 
techniques. This interaction of firms is well-documented and is often put forward as the 
principle reason for the economic success of industrial districts. Amin, in his study of 
industrial districts in Italy, holds that ‘the single elements of the system flourish as a 
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result of their interdependence; not because any one of them, however competent, is 
capable of playing on the stage alone’ (1989, 119-120). 
 
However, this lack of autonomy alone does not ensure that power is not held by 
dominant firms in the district. Certainly, some industrial districts, for example, the 
Baden-Wurttemberg district,  are characterised by a few dominant firms who produce 
the final good and a network of smaller component suppliers. Herrigel considers the 
dispersal of power in the Baden-Wurttemberg district. His definition of power is the 
following: ‘the capacity to participate in the (re)definition and (re)composition of the 
organisational and institutional structure of the industrial system itself’ (1993, 226). This 
suggests that power is diffused across all participants in the district. This is supported 
by the following statement: ‘final decision-making authority or responsibility for the 
reproduction of the system is not located in any single organisation within the system’ 
(1993, 226). This suggests a collective power of the type Foucault put forward. 
However, Herrigel does go on to make a distinction between those with power in the 
system and those without: ‘those with less power in the system are those without direct 
organisational access to it, such as workers, women, environmentalists and their 
organisations, the trade unions and community organisations’ (1993, 233). This 
indicates a ‘power as capacity to dominate’ definition. For Herrigel, it is the ‘power-
holding actors’ who decide on the structure of the industrial system; he talks about the 
‘efforts on the part of contestants for power to maintain (or enhance) their position in 
the system’ (1993, 233). He outlines three characteristics of the Baden-Wurttemberg 
industrial district: ‘co-operation; openness/trust; and self-policing through fear 
(prudence)’ (1993, 233). Thus, power in the district is defined as power as capacity by 
some firm, group of firms, or authority, which is operated through coercion1. This 
conflicts with the Foucauldian network. 
 
In some industrial districts, power does not reside with the producer of the final good. 
For example, Cappechi, in his study of the Emilia-Romagna industrial district, observes 
that ‘the factory that produced the final good did not necessarily constitute the centre of 
the sub-system because its role was often only that of assembling various parts 
produced by other firms, and some of these parts were so vital that their producers 
could set their own prices’ (1989, 201). This suggests a shift of power from one group 
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of firms to another, rather than a change in the nature of power itself. As with the 
Baden-Wurttemberg example, this  does not correspond to the Foucauldian network. 
  
Most industrial districts are, however, characterised by a number of similar-sized firms 
acting interdependently and without a dominant party. While lack of a dominant firm is 
not the overriding feature of industrial districts, it does raise an important distinction 
between types of industrial districts on the basis of types of competition which occur 
and the type of power relations they reflect. It is the latter type of district which we 
argue might fruitfully be investigated using a Foucauldian framework.  
 
We argue that Foucauldian power is synonymous with co-operative competition. This 
occurs in the following way. In the Foucauldian industrial district no one firm or group of 
firms has the power to dominate. All firms behave according to established norms 
which are maintained by the social and commercial relationships formed within the 
district over time. Co-operative competition develops as a norm, in a way that is directly 
analogous to the development of norms in society described by Foucault. Through 
these norms, the operation of power within the district controls firms, not by coercion, 
but by influencing their decisions to behave. Firms act in the same way as Foucault’s 
individuals - as if according to their own free will. Traditional competition could not 
develop as a social norm under this type of power relationship, because, under non-
constant returns to scale, one firm or a group of firms would eventually come to 
dominate the district4. The district would, in this case, conform to the traditional 
definition of power.     
 
A review of the literature shows that many districts could be described as Foucauldian 
industrial districts in that power does not rest with any one firm or group of firms, but to 
what extent are social bonds of the Foucauldian type found in industrial districts?  
 
The literature on industrial districts highlights a web of relations, both social and 
commercial. It is this variety of relations which reduces the likelihood of traditional types 
of power relations. Social relations between firms exist primarily between family 
members, previous employees, former colleagues and friends who grew up together 
and now own firms in the same district. Owners of firms who know each other socially 
are more likely to share information and thus co-operate informally, by, for example, 
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lending tools or helping out to ensure an order is finished on time. Interestingly, 
Kristensen points out that in many cases individuals do not consider these activities to 
be ‘co-operation,’ rather it is just ‘helping relatives or friends’ (1990, 152). This 
suggests that the norms are so embedded in everyday commercial life that they are 
not recognised as such by those who act according to them. Firms, through social and 
personal ties, willingly divulge information about their business practices.  
 
It is clear that what is deemed to be acceptable behaviour is developed over time within 
the district.  For example, in Santiago, Wilson points to the development of norms for 
working conditions and pay which actually facilitated the growth of small firms within 
the district: 
 
loom work was arduous and under-paid; there was no way that workshop 
owners could reimburse male workers with wages on a par with migrants’ 
earnings. Instead, it was generally accepted that owners would give assistance 
at some future date when the worker wished to separate to start his own 
business. A ‘good’ worker could expect a credit advance and/or machines 
which a ‘good’ owner would settle on him on easy terms (1992, 61). 
 
If other employers do not adopt this strategy, then they run the risk of not being able to 
find reliable employees in the future and other firms may be less willing to work with 
them. The spatial concentration of firms within a district means that information on 
behaviour flows freely. Spatial concentration, along with the subcontracting process of 
production, acts as a means of surveillance of the behaviour of firms. This ensures that 
informal arrangements such as those in the Santiago district are adhered to.  
 
This corresponds to Foucault’s description of surveillance as a means whereby 
individuals remain under the influence of the discipline. Within the district, it is the 
importance of maintaining a good reputation which ensures that firms behave 
according to the norms developed in the district over time. Specialised production units 
mean that each firm requires the business of others. A reputation for late deliveries or 
poor quality could put a firm out of business. This is the ultimate punishment for failing 
to behave according to established norms. Whether conflict of this nature is controlled 
in the way Foucault describes, through surveillance, examination and punishment, 
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would require a closer investigation of how norms are maintained within districts. 
However, many descriptions of co-operative behaviour in the industrial districts 
literature do seem to imply that social bonds are generated and maintained in the way 
described by Foucault. For example, Ottati shows that  ‘a whole series of local 
institutions complement social control in the industrial district to ensure conformity to 
the custom of mutual co-operation in support of the collective capital of trust’ (1994, 
532).  
 
To what extent can this co-operative behaviour be learned over time? Sabel (1992) 
looks at the development of co-operative links in four industry groups within the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Commonwealth introduced a `Manufacturing 
Innovation Networks (MAIN) project’ in 1989. In his study of this project,  Sabel 
emphasizes the importance of trust in sustaining industrial districts. He argues that 
districts whose co-operation depends solely on self-interest will not survive conflicts 
which inevitably arise (1992, 239). The MAIN project encouraged the participants in the 
four selected project groups to study their industry together in order to develop trust 
among them. Sabel concludes that `it was this process which created the possibility for 
redefining collective identities and cleared the way for studied trust’ (1992, 239). Sabel 
shows how, for the Lehigh project group, the study changed the focus of the 
participants: 
 
 the problem became less one of regularising sweatshops (the original “union” 
view), or outwitting an out-dated but still powerful monopolist (the new-
immigrant view), and more a question of rethinking the collective needs of the 
new specialist firms in the Valley, their relation to one another, and ultimately 
their relation to the manufacturers and retailers in New York (1992, 240). 
 
The study provoked the development of a collective consciousness which, according to 
Sabel, is a precondition for trust. One could also imagine how such a process 
facilitated the development of mutually agreed upon norms of behaviour which would 
also strengthen the district. 
 
There are also more formal, commercial relationships between firms within districts 
which are administered by associations and government agencies. In these cases, co-
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operation is more clearly identified, though not necessarily more powerful than, social 
and personal relationships. In Ikast, in Denmark, the co-operative association, 
Danikast, has facilitated the collective purchasing of raw materials and the organisation 
of transportation for employees (Kristensen 1990, 150). In the Emilia-Romagna district, 
small entrepreneurs established an association to provide administration and 
accounting services (Brusco 1982, 173). These firms are competitors, subcontractors, 
suppliers and customers of one another but they co-operate in order to facilitate 
efficiency and competition.  This is the essence of co-operative competition - the 
realisation that firms cannot survive unless they co-operate and compete. 
 
These associations and government agencies appear to fulfil the same role as the 
disciplines in Foucault’s framework. They facilitate the collection of data both on the 
firms in the district and on the industries in which they operate. They facilitate 
surveillance. They formalise and maintain the norms of behaviour for firms within the 
district. In several cases, government agencies have been instrumental in initiating co-
operation between firms. In Cyprus, government policies actively encouraged furniture 
firms  jointly to open a retail outlet for which they would produce specialised products 
(Murray 1990). In West Jutland, government funds ‘were made available for financing 
an export agent if four firms worked together in co-operative export promotion’ 
(Kristensen 1990, 152). In this case, as soon as government support for this co-
operation stopped, most firms reverted to the traditional form of competition without co-
operation.  Co-operative competition was artificially created by government agencies 
and the norms arising out of this government policy were not deeply embedded in 
firms’ decision-making strategies. This suggests that, at least in the case of West 
Jutland, the agency had its own ideology which it tried to superimpose on the district. 
This corresponds to the way in which disciplines change our behaviour according to 
their definitions of what constitutes acceptable behaviour in the Foucauldian network.  
 
The Foucauldian approach allows for power to be external to individual firms but 
internal to the district. Because power is not internal to any individual firm it is possible 
for trust, and therefore co-operation, to co-exist with competition. For example, in West 
Jutland, where a number of firms compete to win an order, ‘a winning firm often has to 
use as subcontractors some of the firms which competed with it for the customer, in 
order to be able to deliver the promised goods’ (Kristensen 1992, 151). In this case, a 
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traditional model would argue that the firm which wins the contract has the power to 
decide which firms to subcontract its work to. It may even, if this is more ‘neo-
classically’ efficient, decide to use flexible specialisation to internalise the job. In 
practice, however, the firm which is awarded the contract can only tender for the 
contract on the basis that it believes that it will be able to call on the assistance of 
competing firms to ensure the order is competed in time. This example shows clearly 
the interdependence of co-operation and competition. We argue that this 
interdependence can only exist if power is dispersed across the district as opposed to 
residing with any one firm or group of firms.    
 
This brief look at the existing literature on industrial districts would indicate that many 
exhibit features of Foucauldian power. Foucault argues that individuals are subjected 
to the power-knowledge at work in the social network, but are also created by it. 
Likewise, firms in many industrial districts are dominated, not by larger firms, but by the 
norms of behaviour which they themselves have developed as a means to greater 
commercial success. Those norms reflect Foucault’s power-knowledge, and it results 
in co-operative competition. Without co-operative competition, these firms would not be 
internationally competitive. Thus, they are both subjected to, and created by, the power 
of the district. Their subjection arises, not out of fear, rather out of their own ‘freedom’ 
to act according to the norms of the district. It seems that many industrial districts 
behave as Foucauldian micro-powers.  
 
V. 
This paper argues that the concept of power has been inadequately analysed by the 
disparate literature on industrial networks. It suggests that the Foucauldian framework 
might provide a useful analysis of how some types of networks are established and 
maintained. It is appropriate to those networks where co-operation between firms has 
developed through informal interrelationships rather than through  the traditional model 
of coercion of large firms over small. In other words, it provides a tool of analysis in 
those circumstances where power clearly operates, but not  in the form of power as 
dominance or repression. 
 
The Foucauldian analysis provides an underlying rationale for the existence of  co-
operative competition. Although the fact that firms within certain types of networks co-
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operate and compete has been well noted in the literature, researchers have tended to 
treat the two as autonomous or even conflicting concepts. As a result, the traditional, 
neo-classical definitions of competition have been retained. In contrast, in co-operative 
competition, the two are not mutually exclusive but rather are opposite (but not 
opposing) sides of the same coin. The industrial district literature has identified the 
interdependence of co-operation and competition, but has developed no underlying 
theoretical framework with which to analyse this empirical phenomenon. An analysis of 
power relationships between firms should form a part of any theoretical framework, 
since it is power relationships which are intrinsic to the type of competition which 
develops.     
 
Our survey of the literature on industrial districts leads us to suggest that many 
industrial districts could be characterised as exhibiting Foucauldian power relations. In 
these districts, power is held by the district itself, rather than by a dominant firm or 
group of firms. This facilitates the development of co-operative competition, which is 
generated and maintained by the social and commercial norms developed in the 
district over time. Firms willingly behave in accordance with these norms. Behaviour is 
not determined through coercion and fear but instead through the operation of the 
norms, the district controls firms’ decisions to behave. Associations and government 
agencies take the role of Foucauldian disciplines to ensure that norms are adhered to. 
In certain cases, it is these agencies that are responsible for meting out punishment to 
firms who behave in an unacceptable way. However, whether the Foucauldian 
techniques of power - observation, judgement and examination - appear in industrial 
districts would require a deeper examination than the one presented here. The next 
stage is a genealogy of industrial districts. We believe that such an approach would 
provide a useful theoretical underpinning to the description of firm behaviour in 
industrial districts. 
 
The adoption of  a Foucauldian framework, however, goes far beyond the utilisation of 
a handy method for identifying and classifying the norms of behaviour found in 
industrial networks. It involves the acceptance of a poststructuralist agenda for 
industrial analysis. For Foucault and the others of the poststructuralist school, on the 
other hand, reality is something we create; it is not an independent entity. Foucault’s 
aim was to reveal the structural laws or codes which create and maintain the reality we 
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observe5. Even the social and human disciplines themselves are a part of that process 
of creation and maintenance. They facilitate surveillance and the creation of the norms 
which govern acceptable societal behaviour. Thus the adoption of a Foucauldian 
framework necessitates consideration of the role of those disciplines which are 
involved in the discussion about new forms of competition, in creating the new forms of 
competition they are discussing. It prompts us to look for an `epistemic rupture’ 
(Kearney, 1994, 29); that is, a change in the cultural laws and codes which allowed for 
and encouraged the development of new forms of competition.  In a Foucauldian 
analysis, the question is not which theories should be developed to explain the co-
operative competition we observe, but rather how did the theories of the disciplines and 
other cultural developments create, facilitate and justify the co-operation between firms 
that we observe? 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1
 The authors would like to thank David Jacobson and Ingrid Jeacle for many helpful 
comments on earlier drafts.  
 
2
 Lukes’ definition of power is the following: `I have defined the concept of power by 
saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s 
interests’ (1974, 34). 
 
3
 Sewell and Wilkinson describe the panopticon as follows: `it comprises a central 
observation tower surrounded by a concentric ring of peripheral cells. Observers reside 
in the tower and gaze directly into every cell. Meanwhile, these cells are only open to 
the front, where the incarcerated individual has a clear view of the tower but is shut off 
from contract with any other inmates' (1992, 273). 
 
4
 Herrigel’s characterisation of power in Baden-Wurttemberg as power through 
dominance is supported by Schmitz, who describes the district as consisting of 
‘interesting webs woven by four large spiders: Daimler Benz (Mercedes), Bosch, 
SEC and to a lesser extent, IBM’ (1992, 99). 
 
5
 Under constant returns to scale, power does not reside with an individual firm or 
group of firms within the district, but it does reside with either a monopsonistic buyer 
or with the consumer. This too suggests power as the capacity to dominate. 
 
6
 The aim of archaeology was to reveal a general system of codes underlying 
particular interrelationships. In later writings, Foucault abandoned this structuralist 
notion of a universal set of codes, for a poststructuralist one. Hence,  genealogy was 
concerned, not with the development of a general theory of society but rather  with 
tracing the development of particular laws and codes in particular sub-sections of 
society, e.g. the asylum, the prison and the army camp. 
 
 
 
 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 20 
20 
BIBLIOGRAHY 
 
Amariglio, J. 1988. ‘The body, economic discourse, and power: an economist’s 
introduction to Foucault’ History of Political Economy 20:4, 583-613. 
 
Amin, A. 1989. ‘A model of the small firm in Italy’ in Goodman, E.,  J. Bamford and 
P. Saynor (ed.s)  Small firms and industrial districts in Italy, London: Routledge, 111-
123. 
Benton, L. 1990. ‘The emergence of industrial districts in Spain: industrial 
restructuring and diverging regional responses’ in Pyke F. and W. Sengenberger 
(ed.s) Industrial districts and local economic regeneration  Geneva: International 
Institute for Labour Studies, 48-86. 
Brusco, S. 1982. ‘The Emilian model: Productive decentralisation and social 
integration’. Cambridge Journal of Economics  6, 167-184. 
Capecchi, V. 1989. ‘A history of flexible specialisation and industrial districts in 
Emilia-Romagna’ in Goodman, E, J. Bamford and P. Saynor (ed.s) Small firms and 
industrial districts in Italy, London: Routledge, 20-36. 
Castells, M. and P. Hall, 1994. ‘Silicon Valley: where it all began’ in Castells, M. and 
P. Hall (ed.s) Technopoles of the world: The making of twenty-first-century industrial 
complexes. London: Routledge,  12-29.  
Cousins, M. and A. Hussain, 1984. Michel Foucault London: MacMillan.  
Couzens-Hoy D. 1986. ‘Power, Repression, Progress: Foucault, Lukes and the 
Frankfurt School’ in D. Couzens-Hoy (ed.) Foucault: A Critical Reader Oxford: 
Blackwell, 123-147. 
Davidson, A. 1986. ‘Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics’ in D. Couzens-Hoy (ed.) 1986. 
Foucault: A Critical Reader  Oxford: Blackwell, 221-233. 
Dreyfus, H. and P. Rabinow, 1982. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics  Sussex: Harvester Press. 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 20 
21 
Foucault, M. 1984. ‘Discipline and Punish’, extracts published in Rabinow, P. (ed.) 
The Foucault Reader  London: Penguin. 
Gandal, K. 1994. ‘Intellectual Work as a Political Tool: the Example of Michel 
Foucault’ in Smart, B. (ed.)  Michel Foucault: Critical Assessments London: 
Routledge, 272-283.   
Hamilton, G. and R. Feenstra. 1995. ‘Varieties of Hierarchies and Markets: an 
Introduction’ Industrial and Corporate Change  4:1, 51-87. 
Herrigel, G. 1993. ‘Power and the redefinition of industrial districts’ in Grabher, G. 
The Embedded Firm  London: Routledge, 227-251. 
Hindess, B. 1996. Discourses of Power  Oxford: Blackwell 
Honneth, A. 1991. The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social 
Theory  Camb. Mass: MIT Press.   
Kearney, R. 1994. Modern Movements in Modern Philosophy Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2nd edition. 
Kristensen, P. 1990. ‘Industrial districts in West Jutland, Denmark’ in Pyke, F. and 
W. Sengenberger (ed.s) Industrial districts and local economic regeneration  
Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 122-175. 
Lukes, S. 1974. Power: A Radical View London: MacMillan 
Mueller, F. and R. Loveridge 1995. ‘The “Second Industrial Divide”? The Role of 
the Large Firm in the Baden-Wurttemberg Model’ Industrial and Corporate Change 
4:3, 555-582. 
Murray, R. 1990. ‘Flexible specialisation in small island economies: The case of 
Cyprus’ in Pyke, F. and W. Sengenberger (ed.s) Industrial districts and local 
economic regeneration  Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 255-277. 
Nadvi, K. 1992. ‘Flexible Specialisation, industrial districts and employment in 
Pakistan’. World Employment Programme  Research Working Paper. 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 20 
22 
Dei Ottati, G. 1994, ‘Trust, interlinking transactions and credit in the industrial 
district’ Cambridge Journal of Economics  18, 529-546. 
Rouse, J. 1994. ‘Power/Knowledge’ in Gutting, G. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion 
to Foucault Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 92-114. 
Sabel, C. 1992. ‘Studied trust: Building new forms of co-operation in a volatile 
economy’ in Pyke, F. and W. Sengenberger (ed.s) Industrial districts and local 
economic regeneration  Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 215-250.  
 
Schmitz, H. 1990. ‘Industrial districts: Model and reality in Baden-Württemberg, 
Germany’ in Pyke, F. and W. Sengenberger, (ed.s) Industrial districts and local 
economic regeneration  Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 87-122.. 
-. 1993. ‘Small Shoemakers and Fordist Giants: Tale of a Supercluster’ Ids  
Discussion Paper, no. 331. 
Sewell, G and B. Wilkinson. 1992. ‘“Someone to watch over me”: Surveillance, 
Discipline and the Just-in-time Labour Process’ Sociology 26:2, 271-289. 
Simon, J. 1995. Foucault and the Political London: Routledge 
Sverrisson, A. 1992. Flexible specialisation and woodworking enterprises in Kenya 
and Zimbabwe. Ids bulletin  23:3, 28-33. 
Townley, B. 1993. ‘Foucault, Power-Knowledge, and its Relevance for Human 
Resource Management’ Academy of Management Review 18:3, 518-545. 
 
Williamson, O. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 
New York: Free Press. 
 
-. 1995. ‘Hierarchies, Markets and Power in the Economy: An Economic Perspective’ 
Industrial and Corporate Change 4:1, 21-49. 
 
Wilson, F. 1992. Modern workshop industry in Mexico: on its way to collective 
efficiency?  Ids bulletin  23: 3, 57-63. 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 20 
23 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
